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INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1—popularly called 
either the “ACA,” or “Obamacare” by opponents, proponents, and even 
the White House2—is a complex law totaling nearly a thousand pages in 
length.3 The litigation now before the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell4 
presents, on the surface, a simple issue of statutory interpretation. 
However, that surface has a very thin veneer. If the Court allows 
                                                                                                             
 *  The Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, 
Chapman University, Fowler School of Law. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 124 Stat. 119 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
2 Katie Zezima, Obama: ‘In five years it will no longer be called Obamacare,’ WASH. 
POST (May 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/05/
20/obama-in-five-years-it-will-no-longer-be-called-obamacare/; David Nakamura, 
Obama: “That’s right – I care,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2011, 6:39 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/44/post/obama-thats-right--i-care/2011/10/04/
gIQAtRs4ML_blog.html; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patient_Protection_and_Affordable_Care_Act (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2015). 
3 See supra note 1. 
4 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). 
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administrators carte blanche to change the very words of a statute, we 
will have come a long way towards governance by bureaucrats. Over the 
years, Congress has delegated many of its powers, but it has never 
delegated the power to raise taxes or spend tax subsidies in ways that no 
statute authorizes. 
The ACA, in Section 1311, provides that states shall create an 
American Health Benefit Exchange (“Health Exchanges”).5 If they meet 
certain criteria, they are “Qualified Health Exchanges,” or “Qualified 
Exchanges,” that qualify under the Act for federal subsidies at issue.6 
However, it is clear that Congress does not have the constitutional power 
to order, or commandeer,7 states to enact particular laws. While Congress 
cannot force a state to enact a qualified Health Exchange, it can use its 
taxing and spending power to “bribe” states by offering various 
incentives to those states that enact and implement the kind of laws that 
Congress wants. 
That is what the ACA does. It provides that if a state creates a 
qualified Health Exchange by January 1, 2014, then another section of 
the law—Section 36B, in the Internal Revenue Code—offers generous 
subsidies in the form of ‘‘premium assistance tax credits” and 
“refundable tax credits,” which not only reduce tax liability but also 
provide for federal money paid to private insurance companies.8 As one 
proponent of the law explained, 
[I]f you’re a state and you don’t set up an exchange, that 
means your citizens don’t get their tax credits—but your 
citizens still pay the taxes that support this bill. So, 
you’re essentially saying [to] your citizens you’re going 
                                                                                                             
5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1311, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012)). 
6 Mark Seidenfeld, Tax Credits on Federally Created Exchanges: Lessons from a 
Legislative Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 99 MINN. L. REV. 101 
(2015). 
7 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997); 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.10(d)(i) (“Federal Orders to State and Local 
Governments”) (West Reuters, 5th ed. 2012 (1 Vol.)). 
8 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1401(a), 
124 Stat. 213 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 36B). The U.S. Treasury pays 
these subsidies directly to a taxpayer’s insurer, to offset any premiums owed. Id. at 
§ 1412, 124 Stat. 231 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18082). 
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to pay all the taxes to help all the other states in the 
country.9 
Congress expected that all or most states would take the bribe. Still, 
it created a fallback position: if a state refuses to set up a qualified state 
Health Exchange, a different section of the ACA, Section 1321,10 
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to set up 
Federal Exchanges in those states that refuse to set up qualified Health 
Exchanges. 
No provision of the ACA offers any tax subsidies or payments for 
federally-created (as opposed to State-created) Health Exchanges. That 
supports the carrot-and-stick approach to encourage states to create, 
implement, and maintain state Health Exchanges. In other words, if the 
state creates a Health Exchange, its citizens secure valuable tax benefits 
in addition to acquiring health insurance. If the state refuses to create, 
implement, and maintain a Health Exchange, that state’s citizens will 
lose out on the financial benefits, though they will have to pay federal 
taxes that finance the subsidies that residents in other states (those with 
State-created Exchanges) will receive. 
At the time the law came into being, proponents of Obamacare 
thought that this fallback position would not be necessary, because (1) 
the subsidies were generous; (2) the state and its citizens would lose out 
on these subsidies if it refused to create a Health Exchange; (3) and (in 
their view) the ACA would be a very popular law.11 As the trial court 
acknowledged in King v. Burwell, “Congress did not expect the states to 
turn down federal funds and fail to create and run their own Exchanges. 
Instead, Congress assumed that tax credits would be available nationwide 
because every state would set up its own Exchange.”12 
Over two-thirds of the states (a total of thirty-four states) refused to 
establish their own exchanges for 2014.13 It turned out that the ACA has 
                                                                                                             
9 Peter Suderman, Watch Obamacare Architect Jonathan Gruber Admit in 2012 That 
Subsidies Were Limited to State-Run Exchanges (Updated With Another Admission), 
REASON (Jul. 24, 2014, 9:57 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2014/07/24/watch-obamacare-
architect-jonathan-grube. 
10 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1321(c), 
124 Stat. 186 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)) (authorizing and directing the 
Department of Health and Human Services to “establish and operate such Exchange 
within the State”). 
11 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 408-09 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
12 King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415, 430-31 (E.D. Va.), aff’d sub nom. King v. 
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). 
13 Brief for Petitioner, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014) (No. 14-114), 2014 WL 
7386999, at *7 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
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not been as popular as its proponents believed it would be. Indeed, polls 
show that the more people learn about the law, the less favorably they 
view it.14 
The Administration now wants to extend these subsidies to federally-
created Health Exchanges. Otherwise, fewer people will sign up for 
health insurance because it would be much cheaper to forgo the 
insurance and pay any fine. It makes financial sense for people to avoid 
paying for health insurance until they are ill, because they can purchase 
only when they mean it—Obamacare does not allow insurance 
companies to refuse coverage because of preexisting medical 
conditions.15 
What to do? The response of the IRS was not to ask Congress to 
amend the ACA. Instead, the IRS, by issuing a rule, has amended the 
statute.  The position of the IRS, in a nutshell, is that when Section 36B 
refers to Section 1311 and State Exchanges, there is some sort of 
ambiguity and it really means to refer to Sections 1311 and 1321 and 
Federal or State Exchanges. 
                                                                                                             
14 In October of 2014, polls showed that 
53 percent of people view the Affordable Care Act unfavorably, a 
jump of 8 percentage points since June. July’s results mark the fifth 
time since April 2010, and the first time since January, that at least 
half of Americans are not supportive of the health care reform law. 
The poll found that the share of people who view Obamacare 
favorably fell slightly, to 37 percent, marking the lowest rating the 
law has received since its passage. Views about the ACA remain 
sharply partisan. 
Jeffrey Young, Obamacare Is More Unpopular Than Ever, Poll Shows, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 1, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/01/obamacare-
poll_n_5639192.html. Another poll, in February 2015, concluded, “voters are less 
supportive of government-imposed levels of health insurance.” In addition, “[m]ost think 
consumers are better off with less government involvement in the health care 
marketplace.” Voters Are Less Supportive of Government-Imposed Levels of Health 
Insurance, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/
public_content/archive/health_care_update_archive/february_2015/voters_are_less_
supportive_of_government_imposed_levels_of_health_insurance. 
15 The federal government repeatedly touts this fact. E.g., “[y]our insurance company 
can’t turn you down or charge you more because of your pre-existing health or medical 
condition like asthma, back pain, diabetes, or cancer. Once you have insurance, they can’t 
refuse to cover treatment for your pre-existing condition.” Coverage for Pre-Existing 
Conditions, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/health-care-law-protections/
pre-existing-conditions/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
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ACA, THE SPENDING CLAUSE, AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Congress enacted the ACA using an unusual procedure called 
“reconciliation,” which allowed only limited amendments. Although the 
Democrats controlled both Houses at the time, reconciliation was the 
only way they could secure sufficient votes for final approval. It is 
doubtful that any one individual read the entire bill, or that, in any one 
person did read it, he or she could understand all of its ramifications. The 
bill, after all, is not only very long but also very complex.16 Moreover, it 
is legislation, and a statute never reads like a dime novel. Complex and 
controversial statutes invite litigation. 
Shortly after the President signed the law, on March 23, 2010,17 the 
litigation began. The first significant decision on the Supreme Court 
level was National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.18 A 
particularly controversial portion of the law required people to purchase 
health insurance. A Court majority (but with no majority opinion) 
concluded that the Congress did not have authority to enact that 
provision under the Commerce Clause. 
The Commerce power is broad. Congress can regulate anything that 
crosses a state line (typically highways, railroads, and so forth) or 
anything that uses an instrumentality of interstate commerce (e.g., 
telephones, automobiles, even if the instrumentality does not cross a state 
line).19 Finally, Congress can regulate any [1] commercial [2] activity 
that [3] affects interstate commerce.20 It does not matter if the commerce 
crosses a state line, but there must be “activity” and the activity must be 
“commercial.” Simply holding a handgun is not a commercial activity.21  
Not buying health insurance (like not buying a car) is an omission, not an 
activity. 
Obamacare, of course, affects interstate commerce. Just about 
anything does. If I buy health insurance (or bananas), that transaction 
                                                                                                             
16 The law is wide-ranging in its mandates. For example, it regulates the display of 
nutritional content at chain restaurants. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H)(2010). It imposes 
various taxes and fees on medical devices, 26 U.S.C. § 4191(2010), and tanning booths. 
See 26 U.S.C. § 5000B (2010). It governs break time for nursing mothers while at work. 
29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (2010). Some provisions only apply to certain states. Thus, 
Section 10323, of the ACA extends Medicare coverage to individuals exposed to asbestos 
from a mine in Libby, Montana. Section 2006, increases Medicaid payments only in the 
State of Louisiana. 
17 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
18 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
19 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
20 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-566. 
21 E.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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affects interstate commerce. If I do not buy health insurance (or 
bananas), that failure to act also affects interstate commerce. However, 
the refusal to buy insurance is not an act, but an omission. It is the failure 
to act. That failure to act—doing nothing—is a non-act; it is also not a 
commercial act. All prior cases that upheld federal legislation under the 
Commerce Clause dealt with commercial acts—noncommercial inaction 
is both noncommercial (refusing to buy something is not a commerce) 
and it not a commercial act (inaction is not an act). Thus, a majority of 
the Justices in National Federation of Independent Business held that 
Congress could not use the Commerce Clause to require people to 
purchase insurance. 
As Chief Justice Roberts explained, 
The power to regulate commerce presupposes the 
existence of commercial activity to be regulated. If the 
power to “regulate” something included the power to 
create it, many of the provisions in the Constitution 
would be superfluous. For example, the Constitution 
gives Congress the power to “coin Money,” in addition 
to the power to “regulate the Value thereof.” And it 
gives Congress the power to “raise and support Armies” 
and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” in addition to the 
power to “make Rules for the Government and 
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” If the power to 
regulate the armed forces or the value of money included 
the power to bring the subject of the regulation into 
existence, the specific grant of such powers would have 
been unnecessary. The language of the Constitution 
reflects the natural understanding that the power to 
regulate assumes there is already something to be 
regulated. 
Our precedent also reflects this understanding. As 
expansive as our cases construing the scope of the 
commerce power have been, they all have one thing in 
common: They uniformly describe the power as 
reaching “activity.”22 
                                                                                                             
22 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.. 132 S. Ct. at 2586–87 (internal citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
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Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, filed 
an opinion he labeled a dissent. However, on this issue these four 
Justices agreed with Roberts: 
[T]hat failure—that abstention from commerce—is not 
“Commerce.” To be sure, purchasing insurance is 
“Commerce”; but one does not regulate commerce that 
does not exist by compelling its existence. “[R]egulate” 
[ . . . ] can mean to direct the manner of something but 
not to direct that something come into being. There is no 
instance in which this Court or Congress (or anyone else, 
to our knowledge) has used “regulate” in that peculiar 
fashion.23 
However, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by four other Justices, 
concluded that Congress could impose the individual mandate by using 
the taxing power and that, to save the constitutionality of the law, the 
Court would interpret the “mandate” with its fine for noncompliance as a 
tax.24 
That did not eliminate the constitutional problem with the law. 
Although the Court upheld the individual mandate as a tax, there was 
still the question of whether Congress could force the states to accept the 
statutory provision expanding the states’ obligations under Medicaid—
the so-called Medicaid expansion. The majority (seven to two) held that 
the portion of the law giving the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
the authority to penalize States that chose not to participate in law’s 
expansion of the Medicaid exceeded Congress’s power under the 
Spending Clause. However, the Court (this time, five to four) held that 
the penalization provision was severable, thus saving most of the law. To 
the surprise of many observers, many states—in spite of the federal 
incentives—responded by not expanding Medicaid. 
FEDERAL EFFORTS TO INCENTIVIZE STATES TO CREATE, 
IMPLEMENT, AND MAINTAIN HEALTH EXCHANGES 
The issue in King v. Burwell,25 like the Medicaid expansion, is an 
outgrowth of the Spending Clause issue. In this case, Congress also tried 
to bribe the states using its taxing and spending power. The problem is 
                                                                                                             
23 Id. at 2644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 2598. 
25 Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). 
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that many states did not take the bribe. The Administration responded by 
deciding to change the statute by allowing Federal Health Exchanges to 
take advantage of the federal subsidies. The problem is that the 
Administration did not ask Congress to amend the statute. Instead, the 
IRS simply issued a regulation that amended the statute. Does the IRS 
have power to amend a statute? That is the question.  The Court has 
never allowed an agency to amend a law. 
Congress, the Obama Administration, and the experts who helped 
draft Obamacare expected states to take the rowing oar in implementing 
another important provision of the new law by creating State Health 
Exchanges. President Obama predicted, in 2010, “by 2014, each state 
will set up what we’re calling a health insurance exchange . . . .”26 Two 
years later, the news media at the time reported that “Obama and 
lawmakers assumed that every state would set up its own exchange.”27 
This optimism was unwarranted. In fact, as of 2014, thirty-four states 
refused to establish their own exchanges.28 
The Secretary of Health and Human Services testified before a 
House Committee that she expected the states to create these Exchanges. 
Her optimism that the states would do so was one of the reasons she gave 
why the President opposed the single-payer model, where the federal 
government would run everything. 
So this really starts at the States. States put together 
exchanges either as a single State or in a multi-State 
area, if that is what they choose. We provide technical 
assistance to the States to do that. And even though the 
timetable for exchanges doesn’t begin until 2014, we 
intend, starting next year, to begin very robust 
discussions so that we don’t wait until the last minute 
and have States in a situation where they can’t do this. 
We have already had lots of positive discussions, and 
                                                                                                             
26 Remarks by the President on Health Insurance Reform in Portland, Maine, THE 
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2010, 3:17 PM), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-health-insurance-reform-portland-maine. 
27 Robert Pear, U.S. Officials Brace for Huge Task of Operating Health Exchanges, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/us/us-officials-brace-
for-huge-task-of-running-health-exchanges.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
28 Brief for Petitioner, supra, note 11, at *7. Contra Analysis of Enrollment in the 
Marketplaces for the First Month of the 2015 Open Enrollment Period, U.S. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2014pres/12/20141230a.html (noting that the Federal Government, in its HealthCare.gov 
website, reported that in December 2014, only 12 states and the District of Columbia 
were using their own Marketplace platforms). 
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States are very eager to do this. And I think it will very 
much be a State-based program.29 
Professor Jonathan Gruber,30 who was involved with drafting the 
statute, later acknowledged said that the reason that the law limited 
federal subsidies to State-established Health Exchanges was to 
incentivize the states to set up Health Exchanges: 
What’s important to remember politically about this is if 
you’re a state and you don’t set up an exchange, that 
means your citizens don’t get their tax credits—but your 
citizens still pay the taxes that support this bill. So 
you’re essentially saying [to] your citizens you’re going 
to pay all the taxes to help all the other states in the 
country. I hope that that’s a blatant enough political 
reality that states will get their act together and realize 
there are billions of dollars at stake here in setting up 
these exchanges.31 
He made that claim repeatedly.32 
The law as written encourages states to create what it called “Health 
Insurance Exchanges’’ to implement the ACA. The law provides tax 
credits and subsidies for people who purchase health insurance through a 
state exchange. If the state did not create an Exchange meeting federal 
standards, the federal government would create a federal exchange. The 
people who purchased health insurance through a federal exchange 
would not get these tax credits and subsidies. That setup encourages 
states to set up Qualified Exchanges because, otherwise, the citizens of a 
state without a state-established Exchange would not be eligible for 
                                                                                                             
29 FY 2011 Budget Overview: Department of Health and Human Services: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Serv., Educ. and Related Agencies of 
the Comm. on Appropriations, H. R.,111th Cong. 2d Sess. (April 21, 2010) (testimony of 
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of HHS) (emphasis added). 
30 See Ronald D. Rotunda, Jonathan Gruber and the Wisdom of Crowds, VERDICT-
JUSTIA (Dec. 29, 2014), https://verdict.justia.com/2014/12/29/jonathan-gruber-wisdom-
crowds. 
31 Peter Suderman, Watch Obamacare Architect Jonathan Gruber Admit in 2012 That 
Subsidies Were Limited to State-Run Exchanges (Updated With Another Admission), HIT 
& RUN BLOG (Jul. 24, 2014 9:57 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2014/07/24/watch-
obamacare-architect-jonathan-grube. 
32 Sara Hurtubise, Obamacare Architect Says AGAIN That Subsidies Were Only 
Supposed To Go To State Exchanges, DAILY CALLER (Jul. 25, 2014, 2:13 PM), 
http://dailycaller.com/2014/07/25/obamacare-architect-says-again-that-subsidies-were-
only-supposed-to-go-to-state-exchanges/. 
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federal financial help.33 These people would not get federal assistance, 
even though the taxpayers in that state would have to pay the federal 
taxes used to finance the tax credits and subsidies that the citizens of 
other states would enjoy. 
In addition to incentives (carrots), the ACA has disincentives (sticks) 
to prod states to set up Health Exchanges. For example, the law penalizes 
states that do not create Exchanges by barring them from narrowing their 
state Medicaid programs until “an Exchange established by the State . . . 
is fully operational.”34 
THE ACA’S CAREFULLY-CRAFTED DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATES, 
ENTITIES TREATED AS STATES, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
No section of the ACA defines “state” to include the federal 
government. However, other provisions make clear that Congress knew 
how to draft language that treated a non-state as a “state” for purposes of 
any provision of the ACA. 
For example, the ACA provides that territories of the United States 
(e.g., Guam) are “States,” for purposes of this law.  Section 1323 states 
that if a “territory” creates an Exchange, it “shall be treated as a State” 
under this law. Another section, Section 1304(d), provides that 
Washington, D.C. is a “state” for purposes of the subsidy dealing with 
State Health Exchanges. “In this title, the term ‘State’ means each of the 
50 States and the District of Columbia.”35 However, no section of the law 
defines “state” to include the federal government. 
An earlier version of the bill—one that Congress did not enact—
provided that “any references in this subtitle to the Health Insurance 
Exchange . . . shall be deemed a reference to the State-based Health 
Insurance Exchange.”36 That would treat Federal Exchanges the same as 
State Exchanges. Congress did not enact that version. The fact that it 
considered such express language surely is evidence that Congress knew 
                                                                                                             
33 Jonathan H. Adler and Michael F. Cannon, Another ObamaCare Glitch, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970203687504577006322431330662 (“Congress may have wanted to 
limit assistance to state-run exchanges—including encouraging states to create exchanges 
so that the federal government doesn’t have the burden.”) 
34 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 2001(b)(2) 
(2010), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg)). 
35 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1304(d), 
124 Stat. 187 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18024). 
36 H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §308(e) (2009) (emphasis added). 
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how to provide that the law would treat a State-created Exchange and a 
Federal Exchange the same. 
Section 1401 of the ACA adds Section 36B to the Internal Revenue 
Code.37 This section authorizes federal tax-credit subsidies for health 
insurance coverage that anyone purchases through an “Exchange 
established by the State under section 1311”38 of the statute. Section 36B 
is several pages in length and focuses only on State-created Health 
Exchanges. When the ACA was codified, that section became part of the 
Internal Revenue Code.39 
CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
Case law tells us that, in general, courts should defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of the statute governing it. The leading case is Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,40 hence courts 
and commentators often refer to this principle as Chevron deference. The 
Court first decides if “Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.”41 Second, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue,” the Court determines if “the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”42 In 
Chevron, the Court held that an Environmental Protection Agency 
regulation that allowed states to treat all pollution-emitting devices 
within same industrial grouping as though they were encased within 
single “bubble” was based on permissible construction of the term 
“stationary source” in the Clean Air Act Amendments.43 
In this case, the IRS is not even interpreting the sections of the law 
governing it. Recall that when a majority of the states refused to establish 
a qualified Health Exchange,44 HHS (not the IRS) establishes Health 
                                                                                                             
37 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1401, 124 
Stat. 213 (2010) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 36B). 
38 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1311, 124 
Stat. 173 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)). 
39 “Refundable credit for coverage under a qualified health plan.” 26 U.S.C. § 36B 
(2010). 
40 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
41 Id. at 842. 
42 Id. at 843. 
43 Id. at 859. 
44 As of January 2015, only 14 states have established Health Exchanges. Analysis of 
Enrollment in the Marketplaces for the First Month of the 2015 Open Enrollment Period, 
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/news/
press/2014pres/12/20141230a.html; Susan Jones, Jonathan Gruber: No Obamacare 
Subsidies in States That Don’t Set Up Exchanges, CBS NEWS (Jan. 5, 2015, 11:28 AM), 
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Exchanges under Section 1321 of the law.45 However, no section of the 
ACA authorizes any subsidies for Section 1311 Exchanges. Hence, the 
IRS issued regulations that provide that it will extend tax-credit subsidies 
for insurance purchased through Exchanges established by the federal 
government under Section 1321. The IRS claims that it is resolving 
ambiguity in sections 1311 and 1321. However, both of those sections 
are in title 42 of the United States Code. The IRS is not responsible for 
interpreting or enforcing title 42. HHS is responsible for title 42. 
Assuming that there is any ambiguity of what “Section 1321” means, or 
what “state” means, never before has the Court held that the IRS can 
define a term that is in the jurisdiction of another agency. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE BENEATH THE VENEER OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
In Massachusetts v. E.P.A., various states, local governments, and 
environmental organizations sought review of an order of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).46 The EPA had denied a 
petition for rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor 
vehicles under the Clean Air Act.47 The District of Columbia Circuit 
rejected the petitions and the Supreme Court reversed, saying: “[W]hile 
the President has broad authority in foreign affairs, that authority does 
not extend to the refusal to execute domestic laws.”48 The Court held that 
the EPA could not avoid taking regulatory action under the Clean Air 
Act regarding greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.49 
The EPA argued that, in its expert view, a number of voluntary 
executive branch programs already provided an effective response to the 
threat of global warming.50 Moreover, it had concluded that regulating 
greenhouse gases might impair the President’s ability to negotiate with 
“key developing nations” to reduce emissions.51 It also argued that 
limiting motor-vehicle emissions would reflect an inefficient and 
                                                                                                             
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/jonathan-gruber-no-obamacare-subsidies-
states-dont-set-exchanges. 
45 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1321(c), 
124 Stat. 186 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)). 
46 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
47 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521. 
48 In Massachusetts v. E.P.A., the Court complained that the “EPA has refused to 
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piecemeal approach to address the problem of climate change.52 The 
majority rejected all those arguments.53 
In response to Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated 
greenhouse-gas emission standards for not only new motor vehicles but 
also stationary sources. The statute provided that a “major emitting 
facility” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year 
of “any air pollutant” (or 100 tons per year for certain types of sources). 
However, the EPA recognized that requiring permits for all sources with 
greenhouse-gas emissions above these low statutory thresholds would 
drastically expand those programs and render them, in the EPA’s word, 
“unadministrable.” Hence, the EPA purported to “tailor” its programs by 
providing that sources would not become subject to the law if they 
emitted less than 100,000 tons per year of greenhouse gases.54 
The problem with the EPA’s regulation was that the statute it was 
allegedly “interpreting” provided for different numbers. In Utility Air 
Regulatory Group v. EPA,55 Justice Scalia, for the Court, held that EPA 
lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s unambiguous numerical thresholds 
of 100 or 250 tons per year to accommodate its greenhouse-gas-inclusive 
interpretation of the permitting triggers.56 The EPA wanted to make sure 
that these thresholds were much higher. It purported to interpret “100 
tons” or, in some circumstances, “250 tons” to mean greenhouse gases to 
100,000 tons per year. The Court explained the issue pithily: 
How, given the statute’s language, can the EPA exempt 
from regulation sources that emit more than 250 but less 
than 100,000 tpy [tons per year] of greenhouse gases 
                                                                                                             
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 533-35. On the other hand, courts do not have carte blanche to second-guess 
agency nonenforcement actions. In Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), the Court 
held that there is a presumption of unreviewability of decisions of agency not to 
undertake an enforcement action. It also held that the plaintiffs did not overcome this 
presumption. In this case, prison inmates sued to compel the Food and Drug 
Administration to take enforcement action under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act with respect to drugs used for lethal injections to carry out the death penalty. The 
Court rejected the inmates’ claims. There were no dissents. Chaney was really a standing 
case, although the Court never used the word “standing.” Instead, it explained that no one 
was coerced by nonenforcement. In Massachusetts v. E.P.A., the petitioners alleged 
sufficient harm. 
54 Util. Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
55 Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. 2427. 
56 Id. at 2445. 
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(and that also do not emit other regulated pollutants at 
threshold levels)?57 
The Court’s answer was as unambiguous as the statutory reference to 
250 tons per year: 
Were we to recognize the authority claimed by EPA in 
the Tailoring Rule, we would deal a severe blow to the 
Constitution’s separation of powers. Under our system 
of government, Congress makes laws and the President, 
acting at times through agencies like EPA, “faithfully 
execute[s]” them. The power of executing the laws 
necessarily includes both authority and responsibility to 
resolve some questions left open by Congress that arise 
during the law’s administration. But it does not include a 
power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to 
work in practice.58 
This case certainly looks like the identical twin to Utility Air 
Regulatory Group. The statute at issue — the ACA —provides that there 
are only subsidies of Health Exchanges created pursuant to State 
Exchanges established under Section 1311. The IRS claims that it can 
“interpret” these sections (including sections that it does not administer 
but HHS administers), find that there is some sort of ambiguity, and 
conclude that Section 1311 really means Sections 1311 and 1321, and 
State Exchanges really means Federal or State Exchanges. No Supreme 
Court has ever held that an agency could define Section 1311 to mean 
“Section 1311 and Section 1321.” 
The assertion of a Presidential power or an agency power to amend, 
unilaterally, or to suspend statute raises significant questions. If the 
President has absolute discretion to ignore laws that he prefers not to 
exist, the Constitutional limits of Presidential authority have the 
restraining power of air. President George H.W. Bush, in the course of 
his Presidency, unsuccessfully argued that Congress should lower the 
capital gains rate. Instead, could he have simply instructed the IRS to 
lower to tax capital gains to no more than a 10% rate, no matter what the 
law provides? The IRS, under this theory, could advise taxpayers to 
compute their capital gains tax and then send the IRS only 10% of the 
gain instead of 28%. 
                                                                                                             
57 Id. at 2451. 
58 Id. at 2446 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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In 1998, in Clinton v. New York,59 the Court held that it was 
unconstitutional to give the President a line item veto; under that statute, 
Congress could override that veto. The power of the President to suspend 
or waive a constitutional law when the law itself delegates no such power 
to the President is much more powerful than a line item because there is 
no procedure to override a Presidential Decree. Why should lobbyists 
urge Congress to create, extend, or change a tax deduction, when all they 
have to do is persuade the President? 
CONCLUSION 
The reasoning of Utility Air Regulatory Group goes beyond statutory 
interpretation. The Court explained the constitutional problem with the 
EPA’s claim. Under our system of government, Congress makes laws, 
while the President executes them. “The power of executing the laws 
necessarily includes both authority and responsibility to resolve some 
questions left open by Congress that arise during the law’s 
administration. But it does not include a power to revise clear statutory 
terms that turn out not to work in practice.”60 The President’s 
constitutional power to execute laws cannot include the power to revise 
clear statutory terms that turned out not to work in practice. 
The claim that the IRS is now making also goes well beyond an issue 
of statutory interpretation. If the IRS can define “Section 1311” to mean 
“Section 1311 and Section 1321,” it is very hard to see where any 
boundaries will come to be. Since the Great Depression, the regulatory 
state has become stronger. The initial theory was that unbiased “experts” 
could decide these issues that are not questions with which democracy 
should concern itself. 
We know that is not the case. Administrative decisions can be much 
more significant than issuing a regulation that defines “grain elevator.” 
Administrators promulgate regulations that are often “self-financing” 
because “they place the costs of compliance on the private sector.”61 
Unelected administrators, hidden from public view, decide significant 
and controversial issues such as “net neutrality,” or the future of the 
Internet. Regulators (and the President who appoints them) can use 
                                                                                                             
59 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
60 Util. Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2446. See also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal 
Co., 534 U.S. 438, 462 (2002) (holding that the Commission did not have the authority 
“to develop new guidelines or to assign liability in a manner inconsistent with the 
statute”). 
61 See the thoughtful analysis in, F.H. BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING: THE 
RISE OF CROWN GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 152-53 (Encounter Books, 1st ed. 2014). 
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complex regulations that are written in jargon to reward political friends 
and burden political enemies. One of the complaints about the enactment 
of Obamacare was that the President’s “waivers” of various 
provisions62—waiver that the statute did not authorize—served to reward 
the President’s political supporters or undercut objections to the law.63 
The holding in King v. Burwell64 should be a very good signpost, 
telling us either that the speed limit on the road to an administrative state 
has been lifted, or that there are speed bumps ahead. 
                                                                                                             
62 Id. at 287-88. Just before the vote on the ACA, the Department of Justice announced 
it was dropping its investigation of Congressman Alan Mollohan; he had been 
“undecided” and then voted for the bill. Paul Kane, Justice Dept. ends probe of Rep. 
Mollohan, (Jan. 26, 2010, 3:25 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/01/26/AR2010012601156.html. 
63 Ronald D. Rotunda, On the Health-Care Mandate, Obama Reaches Beyond the 
Law, WASH. POST (Jul. 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/on-the-
health-care-mandate-obama-reaches-beyond-the-law/2013/07/18/d442aefc-efb4-11e2-
a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html. 
64 Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 475. 
